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Abstract 
It is claimed to be a crucial advantage of supervaluationism over other theories of vagueness that it 
avoids any commitment to sharp boundaries. This thesis will challenge that claim and argue that 
almost all forms of supervaluationism are committed to infinitely sharp boundaries and that some of 
these boundaries are interesting enough to be problematic. I shall argue that only iterated 
supervaluationism can avoid any commitment to sharp boundaries, but on the other hand that is the 
model that Terrance Horgan has recently argued is a form of transvaluationism and thus logically 
incoherent. 
I shall first argue that infinitely higher-order vagueness gives rise to an infinite number of boundaries. 
I will then argue that an infinite number of these boundaries are, in the case of the vague term ‘tall’, 
located over a finite range of heights. I will argue that because of this, these boundaries must be 
infinitely sharp. I shall argue that on every plausible non-iterated supervaluationist model, some such 
boundary will mark a sharp boundary between heights that would make someone ‘more tall than not 
tall’ and heights that would not. Finally I shall argue that this is the sort of interesting sharp boundary 
supervaluationism must not admit. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In this thesis I will argue that interesting and infinitely sharp boundaries arise out of the most 
popular supervaluationist models of vagueness. I shall argue that the only model of 
supervaluationism that might avoid sharp boundaries entirely is iterated supervaluationism 
and conclude that this is the only form of supervaluationism worth considering as a theory of 
vagueness. I‟ll argue that supervaluationist models that admit sharp boundaries share the only 
major problem of epistemicism and epistemicism‟s greater simplicity means it should be 
favoured over models of supervaluationism that admits sharp boundaries. 
 
The thesis can be split into two parts: - 
 
Sections 1 through 5 form an extended introduction to vagueness and supervaluationism. 
Section 2 introduces the phenomena of vagueness and high-order vagueness, the Sorites 
paradoxes they give rise to and the threat these paradoxes make against the meaningfulness of 
everyday terms such a „tall‟ and „human‟. Section 3 introduces supervaluationism and its 
solution to the Sorites paradox. Section 4 briefly introduces three other theories of vagueness, 
namely epistemicism, degree theory and transvaluationism. Section 5 gives details of the 
supervaluationist account of higher-order vagueness.  
 
Sections 6 through 10 present arguments against various supervaluationist models on the basis 
that they give rise to sharp boundaries. Section 6 will give initial case for sharp boundaries in 
a very simple non-iterated model of supervaluationism with logic for the D operator that 
obeys S4. Section 7 will detail Williamson‟s argument for sharp boundaries in another non-
iterated model of supervaluationism with logic for the D operator that is weaker than S4, and 
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his two suggested replies the „near impossible standard‟ reply and iterated supervaluationism. 
It will also draw attention to Horgan‟s most recent argument that iterated supervaluationism is 
a form of transvaluationism. Section 8 will assume the „near impossible standard‟ reply has 
been adopted and argue that the supervaluationist model still gives rise to infinitely many 
infinitely sharp boundaries. Section 9 will argue that whatever model the supervaluationist 
takes, one of the infinitely many infinitely sharp boundaries will be problematic as it will 
mark the exact point of greatest indefiniteness. Section 10 will present my conclusion that 
sharp boundaries make all non-iterated supervaluationist models inferior to epistemicism and 
conclude that the only supervaluationist model worth considering further is iterated 
supervaluationism. 
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2 Introduction to Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox 
 
Vagueness is the linguistic phenomenon where certain terms have borderline cases to which it 
is uncertain whether or not the term applies. Some paradigm examples of vague terms are 
'blue', 'tall' and 'heap'. Take for instance 'blue', for some shade on the borderline between those 
that are blue and those that are green, some bluey-green colour, you will find it impossible to 
decide whether that shade is blue or not. It is a borderline case of 'blue', not clearly blue and 
yet also not clearly not blue. Such borderline cases exist because the extension of the term 
'blue' is vague. That means that we at least don't know its exact extension and intuitively most 
believe is has no exact extension. Similarly 'tall' has a vague extension, so if Francis was 
180cm tall then he would be a borderline case of 'tall' and we would be unable to decide if he 
was tall or not. If pushed we might claim that there is no fact of the matter as to whether 
Francis is tall or not. 
 
 
2.1 The Sorites paradox 
 
We might be tempted to just shrug and accept that some terms are simply vague and refuse to 
give any further analysis. However, vagueness gives rise to logical problems that make such 
naive analyses of vagueness extremely unattractive. The main problem which vagueness gives 
rise to is the Sorites Paradox. The Sorites Paradox is a two premise argument which entails an 
absurd conclusion, the exact formulation varies but an example of a Sorites paradox would 
be: - 
 
(1) A human 10m in height is tall. 
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            (2) All humans less than 0.1mm shorter than a tall human are tall. 
 (3) Therefore, a man 1mm in height is tall. 
 
The paradox can be rewritten in various ways but importantly the 2
nd
 premise can be replaced 
by many premises for each step, in this case for each 0.1mm shorter height considered. For 
instance: - 
 
 (4) A human 10m in height is tall. 
            (5-1) If a human 10000mm in height is tall then a human 9999.9mm in height is tall. 
 ... 
 (5-1,000,000) If a human 1.1mm in height is tall then a human 1mm in height is tall. 
 (6) Therefore, a human 1mm in height is tall. 
 
 
2.2 The threat of global nihilism 
 
We might however still be tempted to try and shrug this off as a problem that need only 
concern mathematicians, logicians and those philosophers who are seeking construct perfect 
proofs. 
 
Vague terms do seem to be effective in communication after all so we might be tempted not to 
be too concerned that they give rise to paradoxes. Why after all should we be worried that the 
logic of the terms of our language isn't perfect when we don't generally in our everyday lives 
away from our desks dealing with non-philosophers bother to create logically perfect 
arguments. If we aren't aiming for logical perfection then why should we be worried if the 
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Sorites paradox demonstrates that we would be bound to fall short of such logical perfection? 
We don't in our ordinary discourse aim for logical perfection and yet our flawed everyday 
discourse does often serve to bring us closer to holding true beliefs. This is surely because 
although what we say and hear may not be perfectly logical, we fill in the gaps as it were in 
the reasoning presented to us. Similarly perhaps vague terms such as 'tall' might not be 
completely logically coherent, but almost every English speaker would know what you meant 
if you told them “Francis is a tall man”. 
 
Unfortunately for anyone wishing to adopt such a dismissive line towards the problem 
presented by the Sorites paradox, the problem runs so deep that it challenges the idea that 
vague terms are meaningful at all. The problem is that without any solution to the Sorites 
paradoxes we must accept them as valid arguments with true premises and we must thus 
accept their conclusions. If we accept that any argument is valid and the premises are true 
then we must accept the conclusion or else we're just not playing the game of rationality 
anymore and can resist any argument on a whim.  
 
If we wish to hold as true that (1) 'A human 10m in height is tall' and (2) 'All humans less than 
0.1mm shorter than a tall human are tall' and accept that the argument is valid we must also 
accept (3) 'Therefore, a human 1mm in height is tall', so it seems we will be forced to accept 
that all humans are tall and 'tall' applies to all humans. What is worse however is that for each 
Sorites argument there is a complementary argument that is equally strong and that points us 
to the opposite conclusion. Consider for instance: - 
 
 (7) A human 1mm in height is not tall. 
            (8) All humans less than 0.1mm taller than a human who is not tall are not tall. 
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 (9) Therefore, a human 10m in height is not tall. 
 
If we can't find fault with this argument then we will be forced to accept that all humans are 
not tall and that 'tall' applies to no humans. I find myself very similarly confident in the truth 
of (7) and (8) as I am of the truth of (1) and (2) and the logical form is identical so it would be 
hard to reject either of the two contradictory conclusions. Combine this with the fact that each 
argument leads to a conclusion that also contradicts our ordinary beliefs about the meaning of 
tall and it seems that the best conclusion one can come to is that in fact 'tall' is simply 
meaningless. 
 
That conclusion itself is bad enough. The conclusion that any term in our language as 
common as 'tall' should turn out to be meaningless is something we should baulk at since 
surely we would have noticed that such a common term was actually meaningless and not 
conveying anything. The real problem however, is that the same argument applies not just to 
'tall' but to a vast number of terms. I gestured earlier to other paradigmatic vague terms such 
as 'heap' and 'blue', the problem is not even limited to terms such as these. 'Human' for 
instance might initially appear not to be susceptible to such an argument, but upon closer 
inspection the series is simply hard to formulate because of the difficulty in defining „human‟. 
If we did try to define what it is to be human then we might well end up referring to common 
genetic code, but in that case it might seem like a single gene wouldn't make the difference 
between being a human and not being a human and so we might accept both: -  
 
(10) Any organism that has all but one gene in common with a human is a human. 
(11) Any organism that has all but one gene in common with a non-human is non-
human.  
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However, if we accept that these two premises are true then we could in theory construct a 
Sorites series of organisms, each with all but one gene in common with their neighbours. One 
end of such a series could start with a genuine human such as you or I, and have at the other 
end an amoeba.  This is of course exactly why evolution leads us to believe that there was no 
particular first human and no answer to which came first, the chicken or the egg.  
 
The point is that as Priest points out: - 
 
Using Sorites arguments we can prove almost anything. For example, we can prove 
that you are a scrambled egg as follows. Let b0 be you, and suppose that there are n 
molecules in your body; let b0, b1,…, bn be the sequence of objects each of which is 
obtained from its predecessor by replacing one molecule of you with a molecule of 
scrambled egg, so that bn is all scrambled egg. Let βi be the statement that you are bi. 
Then clearly β0, and for any i, βi → βi+1. Hence by n applications of modus ponens βn: 
you are a scrambled egg. (Priest, 2003, 9) 
 
And we can hardly object to this line of reasoning for as he goes on to say: - 
 
Thus, even if you were changed by replacing one molecule of your body with a 
molecule of scrambled egg, you would still be as you as you could be. You change 
more than that every morning after breakfast. (Priest, 2003, 12) 
 
Using Sorites arguments we can prove quite absurd things. We can prove that pretty much 
anything falls within the extension of a vague term and we can also switch the argument 
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round to prove that nothing does. We could trivially construct a counter argument to Priest to 
prove that we are not scrambled eggs and even things we think are scrambled eggs are not in 
fact scrambled eggs. These arguments can, if taken as sound, prove that vague terms have in 
their extension both everything and nothing. They reduce vague terms to meaninglessness, 
and since almost all terms are vague this threatens the meaningfulness of all of language. 
 
This threat of what Williamson (1994, 166) termed global nihilism regarding meaning that 
springs from the Sorites paradox, elevates the paradox to something more than a bare 
intellectual puzzle. If we are intellectually honest and rational then we must accept the best 
available solutions to the puzzles we encounter. Therefore, if nihilism is the only working 
solution we have to the Sorites paradox then we must accept it as the best. However, nihilism 
regarding meaning strikes against the very foundations of our everyday beliefs since it renders 
the expressions of those beliefs formalised into language quite literally meaningless and those 
are the building blocks of our very thoughts. We can't accept nihilism and so if we are to 
maintain our intellectual honesty and rationality we must find an alternative. We must find 
another working solution to the Sorites paradox. 
 
 
2.3 Introduction to higher-order vagueness 
 
The phenomenon described above can be referred to as 1
st
 order vagueness and a related 
phenomenon can be identified as 2
nd
 order vagueness. 2
nd
 order vagueness is vagueness about 
whether something is or isn't a borderline case of whether the vague term applies.  So going 
back to our example, there are shades between the shades you can pick out as being on the 
borderline between blue and green and the shades you can pick out as definitely being 'blue'. 
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These shades are such that you will find it impossible to decide whether they are borderline 
cases of 'blue' and might claim that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not they are 
borderline cases of 'blue'. Instead such a shade could be described as 'borderline borderline 
blue'. That there are such borderline borderline shades of blue constitutes the term 'blue' 
having 2
nd
 order vagueness. The situation is very similar in the case of „tall‟. We can pick out 
values such as 180cm that are borderline cases of 'tall' and we can pick out definite cases of 
'tall' such as people 190cm. Then there is a vague borderline between these two sets of cases 
where there are heights, say 184cm, that we would be unable to classify as borderline cases of 
'tall' or not. Such heights are borderline borderline cases of tall and thus 'tall' has 2
nd
 order 
vagueness. 
 
Similarly for some other heights between those which are borderline borderline tall and those 
which are simply borderline tall you'd find it impossible to decide whether they are borderline 
borderline tall or not, so those heights are borderline borderline borderline tall. The feature of 
a term having such borderline borderline borderline cases is called 3
rd
 order vagueness. This 
process of picking out further borderline cases of borderline cases could seemingly go on 
indefinitely since it seems all the borderlines will admit borderline cases. So it seems that for 
all natural numbers n there will be heights such that the predicate formed by n repetitions of 
'borderline' followed by 'tall' will apply to them. This is because it seems at least that for all n 
'tall' has nth order vagueness. All these infinitely many orders of vagueness over 1
st
 order 
vagueness are collectively referred to as higher-order vagueness. 
 
Versions of the Sorites paradox can be constructed concerning the higher-order vagueness of 
terms as easily as regarding the 1
st
 order vagueness. For instance: - 
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(12) A man 184cm in height is borderline borderline tall. 
(13)  A man 0.001mm shorter than a man who is borderline borderline tall is 
borderline borderline tall. 
 
(14) Therefore, a man 1mm in height is borderline borderline tall. 
 
Since 1
st
 order vagueness is the subject of the original Sorites paradox and in some sense the 
most basic form of vagueness, most accounts are built to explain 1
st
 order vagueness and/or 
Sorites paradoxes relating to 1
st
 order vagueness. This top down approach to the construction 
of theories of vagueness means most theories have a very firm and technically solid account 
of 1
st
 order vagueness that isn't easy to criticise. It seems then that a good approach for a critic 
of any theory of vagueness is to try and find fault with the theory's account of higher-order 
vagueness. The theory's account of higher-order vagueness is likely to be some sort of 
extension of the theory's account of 1
st
 order vagueness and since higher-order vagueness 
throws up some unique problems of its own this extension may not be entirely fitting. The 
critic wishing to probe a theory of vagueness for weak points does well therefore to start with 
a close examination of a theory‟s account of higher-order vagueness since it is there if 
anywhere that problems are likely to be found. 
 
Perhaps it might be thought that higher-order vagueness doesn't present as important a 
problem as 1
st
 order vagueness. After all, we do not commonly in everyday life consider 
whether someone is borderline borderline borderline tall or not, these things simply don't 
matter to us and some of our intuitions regarding the nature of higher-orders of vagueness 
weaken the higher the order of the vagueness considered. This is true, but it misses the threat 
that a lack of explanation of higher-order vagueness poses to the meanings of first order vague 
terms. Without some adequate explanation of higher-order vagueness global nihilism once 
again threatens. The threat from higher-order vagueness stems from the Sorites paradoxes it 
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gives rise to, just as it did with 1
st
 order vagueness. As noted, Sorites paradoxes can easily be 
constructed in higher-order vagueness. Now, just as a pair of Sorites paradoxes for 'tall' 
threatens to force us to accept nihilism regarding the meaning of 'tall', a similar pair for 
'borderline tall' immediately threatens to force us to accept nihilism regarding the meaning of 
'borderline tall'. If the results of the opposing Sorites paradoxes for 'borderline tall' are 
accepted, then everyone is accepted to be 'borderline tall' and „not borderline tall‟ and 
therefore „borderline tall‟ is meaningless. However, intuitively (although not 
uncontroversially), it can be claimed that 'borderline tall' means nothing more or less than 'not 
tall and not not tall'. If it is accepted that everyone is „borderline tall‟, then everyone is 'not 
tall and not not tall'. That would mean that everyone would be both tall and not tall and we 
would be forced to accept the nihilistic result that 'tall' is meaningless. Furthermore, since no 
property of 'tall' other than its Sorites susceptibility was used in this argument, global nihilism 
quickly follows. This is the problem with higher-order vagueness: if no solution is given to 
Sorites paradoxes based on higher-order vagueness, then the nihilism regarding the meaning 
of terms like 'borderline borderline... borderline tall' quickly spreads down to nihilism 
regarding the meaning of the simple term, in this case 'tall', and so once again there is a threat 
of global nihilism that needs to be answered. 
 
In order to answer the threat of global nihilism we need to therefore present some analysis of 
vagueness and a solution to the Sorites paradox that doesn‟t lead to the sort of 
meaninglessness that threatens when the absurd conclusions of the paradoxes are simply 
accepted. There are at the moment several competing theories of vagueness but this paper 
shall concentrate on just one, that of supervaluationism, which will be introduced in the next 
section. 
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3 Introduction to Supervaluationism 
 
One of the most popular theories of vagueness is that of supervaluationism. The focus of this 
paper will be an examination of possible sharp boundaries arising in the formal model 
endorsed by this theory. In this section I'll introduce the basic structure of supervaluationism 
and outline its solution to the Sorites paradox. Supervaluationism, like most such terms in 
philosophy refers not to a single theory but rather, as noted by Varzi (2007, 633) a mixed bag 
of theories of vagueness that all share certain features. In the case of supervaluationism they 
all give a similar analysis of 1
st
 order vagueness based on the idea of supervaluating over a set 
of delineations. I'll explain exactly what that means in a moment, but in a single sentence you 
could say that all supervaluationist theories hold that vagueness should be analysed by appeal 
to the multitude of ways in which our ordinary vague language could be made precise. 
 
 
3.1 Delineations 
 
A delineation of a vague language can be thought of as a way in which a vague language 
could be made precise completely. Leaving aside supervaluationism for a moment, if we 
decided to try and do away with the vagueness of English we could try to systematically 
invent a new precise language and call it „Precise English‟ or „Penglish‟. We could attempt to 
go about this task by replacing every vague term with a precise one that aside from its lack of 
vagueness meant roughly the same thing
†
. So for instance 'tall' might be replaced by 'ptall', 
which for a Caucasian human male might simply mean over 182cm in height
‡
. What exact 
meaning we choose for 'ptall' is simply a matter of choice; we could equally well choose to 
                                                 
†
Such a task is almost certainly impossible, but we can imagine what such an exercise would be aiming to create. 
‡
Or rather 183 pcentimetres. 
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define 'ptall' as being over 183cm or over 182.89cm or over 185cm. The way this ties back to 
the idea of a delineation in the supervaluationist model is that the possible precise definitions 
we could choose between as definitions of 'ptall' are known as delineations of 'tall', they are 
the ways in which 'tall' could be made precise. Any possible complete precise language, such 
as „Penglish‟, that contains in place of the vague terms of English delineations of those terms 
is a delineation of English. 
 
Some delineations of 'tall' are closer to being precise analogues of 'tall' than others: over 
182.8963824cm; or over 180cm; or over 183cm etc. are all quite close to the intuitive 
meaning of tall since most English speakers would agree that the vague borderline between 
'tall' and 'not tall' is somewhere around 6 foot. However, on some models not all delineations 
need be so confined by natural language. Williams (2008, 195) for instance endorses a model 
that admits extreme delineations that stretch the meaning of the term. An example of such an 
extreme delineation of 'tall' would be one such that a human is tall if and only if they are over 
3m tall. Another even more extreme delineation of 'tall' that bares almost no relation to the 
actual vague meaning of 'tall' would be the delineation where a human is tall if and only if 
they are less than 400m tall. Such extreme delineations are unimportant to the arguments 
given in this paper but Williams provides a good argument for the inclusion of such extreme 
delineations in the supervaluationist model so I will follow him in allowing for them in the 
model of supervaluationism I will give here. 
 
The delineations of individual terms within a delineated version of a natural language must be 
consistent. So if 'tall' in Penglish means over 183cm then it must do so on all instances of the 
use of that term within Penglish. So if we have the sentence in Penglish “Francis is tall and 
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Louis is not tall”, then whatever tall means it must mean the same in both instances§. If the 
precise meaning of the first instance of 'tall' is over 183cm then it must mean over 183cm in 
the second instance as well rather than say 184cm. 
 
 
3.2 Sharpenings 
 
On the supervaluationist account there's nothing privileged or special about any particular 
delineation. However there is a subset of delineations that are more privileged, more 
legitimate and following Williams' terminology (2008, 195) I'll refer to the members of this 
subset as the sharpenings. Most supervaluationists treat vagueness as semantic indecision 
(Weatherson, 2002, 30). They treat cases of vagueness as cases where we have simply failed 
to decide on a single precise delineation. However, according to such a model the set of 
precise delineations between which we have failed to decide is far smaller than the total set of 
delineations. Looking at our 'tall' example again, if we consider various delineations there are 
some we can rule out, some we have decided that that is not the meaning of the term 'tall'. For 
instance we have implicitly decided that 'tall' does not mean „less than 20cm in height‟ or 
„exactly 183cm in height‟. There are other delineations, which if we treat the vagueness as 
semantic indecision, we can say we haven't decided whether the term means that or not, for 
instance it could be claimed that we haven't decided whether 'tall' means „over 183cm in 
height‟ or not. It would be consistent with our previous usage of the term to decide that it does 
mean that, but nothing in our previous usage has committed us to the term having that exact 
meaning. 
 
                                                 
§
At least assuming certain contextual consistency, if for instance Francis is a man and Louis is a building then 
perhaps 'tall' could have different precise meanings if we treat 'tall' as applied to men and 'tall' as applied to 
buildings as two different terms. 
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Another simple way to understand the concept of a sharpening is by analogy. If we imagine 
the process of creating a knife from a thin bar of metal we could do this by using a file to 
remove metal from one or both sides until the long edge of the metal was sharp. 
 
 
 
 
 
Shown in figure 1 are representations of the cross section of the original unsharpened strip of 
metal, two possible results of sharpening the metal and one sharp edge that can‟t be formed by 
sharpening the original. Clearly (a) is the unsharpened original and (b) and (d) could be 
obtained simply by removing metal from (a). (c) on the other hand would require some form 
of bending or the addition of new metal onto the side, it cannot be obtained from (a) merely 
by sharpening.  There are many different ways the metal can be sharpened by taking different 
amounts of metal from each side, but each of them leaves a sharp edge that was somewhere 
along the board edge of the original unsharpened metal. Supervaluationist sharpenings are 
similar, there are many ways a vague term could be replaced with a precise one, but 
sharpenings place the precise boundary somewhere in the region of the vague boundary of the 
original vague term. A sharpening is a delineation that is the possible result of filing the 
vagueness off the edges of language so to speak. Completing the analogy: (a) is equivalent to 
a vague term and (b), (c) and (d) are all delineations of (a), but only (b) and (d) are 
sharpenings of (a). 
 
Sharpenings of languages will also obey certain rules regarding the interconnectedness of 
vague terms in language. The colour terms 'blue' and 'green' for instance are taken to be 
Figure 1 
 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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exhaustive and exclusive over a certain range of the spectrum colours made up of single 
wavelengths of light and all sharpenings will obey this rule. There are delineations of green 
that place the boundary between the two at 500nm and 510nm and there are delineations of 
blue that place the boundary at those points as well. There are also sharpenings that place the 
green-blue boundary at 500nm and 510nm because these wavelengths are on the vague 
boundary between blue and green (Hardin, 1988, Plate 1), but although there are delineations 
there are no sharpenings that place the boundary of green at 500nm and the boundary of blue 
at 510nm, because then the terms would not be exhaustive in the way required by their use in 
everyday language. Similarly there are no sharpenings that place the boundary of blue at 
500nm and the boundary of green at 510nm because then the terms wouldn't be mutually 
exclusive in the correct way. Kit Fine (1999, 124) termed such logical relations between 
vague terms „penumbral connections‟ and that all sharpenings respect such connections is a 
key feature of supervaluationism that gives rise to many of its advantages over other theories. 
 
 
3.3 Supertruth, superfalsity and supervaluationism 
 
The core principle of supervaluationism is that the multitude of different sharpenings may be 
used to analyse the truth value of the original vague terms. This is done by assessing the truth 
value of a vague statement at each of its sharpenings. If a statement is true according to every 
sharpening then it is said to be supertrue. Similarly if a statement is false according to every 
sharpening it is said to be superfalse. If a statement is neither supertrue nor superfalse, so true 
on some sharpenings but false on others, then it is indeterminate. 
 
So if Francis is over 300cm tall, then since all the sharpenings of the vague term 'tall' will 
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place the boundary between 'tall' and 'not tall' below 300cm the statement <Francis is tall> 
will be supertrue because Francis will be tall according to every sharpening. If Francis were 
shorter, say 183cm, then since 183cm is a borderline case of tall there will be different 
sharpenings that place the boundary above and below that height. According to the 
sharpenings where the boundary is below that height, <Francis is tall> will be true and 
according to the others that place the boundary above that height it will be false. This 
disagreement means that <Francis is tall> is neither supertrue nor superfalse and is thus 
indeterminate. Now looking at a more complex example, such as <Francis is tall and not tall 
and wearing blue jeans>, whatever Francis' height this statement will always be superfalse. 
That is because even if Francis is a borderline case of tall at each sharpening of the whole 
language, one of the conjuncts of the statement will be false and so the whole statement will 
be false at all sharpenings and thus superfalse. 
 
The penumbral connections between vague terms lead to the correct analysis of certain other 
complex statements. Take for instance some patch of colour S on the vague borderline 
between blue and green. A supervaluational analysis of <S is green> will come out as 
indeterminate because the patch is green according on some sharpenings but not on others. 
Similarly <S is blue> will also turn out to be indeterminate. However <S is green or blue> 
will come out as supertrue since the penumbral connections between the two terms guarantee 
that on every sharpening every colour on the  borderline between green and blue will be either 
green or blue. <S is green and blue> on the other hand comes out as superfalse since the 
penumbral connections between the terms blue and green guarantee that on all sharpenings no 
colour will be both blue and green. That seems quite correct and that supervaluationism 
reaches plausible truth values for such sentences involving interrelated vague terms in one 
advantage of supervaluationism. 
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Most supervaluationists hold that statements involving vague terms are only true if they are 
supertrue (Weatherson, 2002, 31). So if Francis is 300cm tall then the supervaluationist claims 
that <Francis is tall> is true because <Francis is tall> is supertrue if Francis is that height. 
 
 
3.4 Supervaluationism and the Sorites paradox 
 
The supervaluationist solution to the Sorites paradox is that the second premise, the inductive 
premise, is always superfalse since on every sharpening some step in the Sorites series does 
make the difference; the second premise is false on every sharpening and thus superfalse. The 
sharpenings disagree about which step will make the difference but not that there will be one. 
 
Looking back at the original example of a Sorites I presented in section 2.1: - 
 
 (1) A man 10m in height is tall. 
            (2)  A man 0.1mm shorter than a tall man is tall. 
 (3) Therefore, a man 1mm in height is tall. 
 
In this form premise (2) is superfalse, because according to every sharpening of 'tall' premise 
(2) is false since a man 0.05mm taller than when the sharpening places the boundary will be 
tall and someone 0.1mm shorter than that will not be tall. To put it another way the 
sharpenings disagree regarding the location of the counter-example, but according to every 
sharpening there is a counter-example so the premise is superfalse and thus false. So the 
argument doesn't have true premises and thus there's nothing paradoxical about the false 
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conclusion. 
 
Now what of the second formulation given in section 2.1 where the second premise is 
replaced with a large set of premises: - 
 
 (4) A man 10m in height is tall. 
            (5-1) If a man 10000mm in height it tall then a man 9999.9mm in height is tall. 
 ... 
 (5-1,000,000) If a man 1.1mm in height it tall then a man 1mm in height is tall. 
 (6) Therefore, a man 1mm in height is tall. 
 
Here none of the premises are superfalse because they are each true on all but a small subset 
of sharpenings, but according to every sharpening there will always be a sharp boundary 
somewhere between 10m and 1mm, so on every sharpening one of the premises (5-1) - (5-
1,000,000) will be false. So according to all the sharpenings of 'tall', one of the premises of 
the argument is false and so some of the premises of the argument aren't supertrue. If truth is 
supertruth as most supervaluationists claim, then this means that not all the premises are true 
as many of them are indeterminate since they are false on some sharpenings and true on 
others, and so there is nothing paradoxical about the false conclusion. 
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4.0 Alternative Theories of Vagueness 
 
The thrust of the criticism of supervaluationism in this paper will be to question what 
theoretical advantages it offers over other competing theories by trying to pin on 
supervaluationism a commitment to sharp boundaries. Therefore for the purposes of 
comparison I will in this section very briefly set out three other theories of vagueness with an 
emphasis on their disadvantages and the criticisms that have been levelled against them. None 
of these should be taken as critiques of the positions themselves since space constraints will 
not allow any sort of rigorous analysis of any position and each of these positions are worthy 
of book length discussion. 
 
 
4.1 Epistemicism 
 
The technically simplest solution to the Sorites paradox is to bite the bullet and accept that for 
some particular number x, <A man x mm in height is tall> is true and <A man x – 0.1 mm in 
height is tall> is false and this is what epistemicism claims. Epistemicism claims that for any 
vague term such as 'tall' there is a sharp line and the extension of the term stops there. 
Technically this is flawless since it amount to nothing more than a straight rejection of 
premise (2) with none of the revisions or extensions to logic and semantics that cause 
problems for other theories. The problem with the theory is equally simple: the solution is 
intuitively wrong because there simply isn't any such sharp line. The whole reason the Sorites 
paradox is problematic is that premise (2) is intuitively true. It beggars belief that something 
as fuzzy as the word 'tall' should underneath it all harbour a perfectly sharp meaning, never 
mind multidimensional vague terms such as 'intelligent'.  
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The hard challenge for the epistemicist then is not to ensure their solution doesn't hide any 
nasty technical hitches or counter-intuitive implications, but to provide some account that will 
make their central massively counter-intuitive claim plausible. The approach they take to this 
is to explain why we believe that there isn't a sharp boundary when, according to them, there 
is. The explanation is that there is an epistemic barrier that prevents us from discovering the 
precise meaning of vague terms and thus leads us to mistakenly believe that there is none. 
Williamson explains this by virtue of margin for error principles (1994, 226). We can't discern 
the difference in height between a man 1751.3mm and one 1751.4mm tall, so if we don't 
know that 1751.3mm is tall we can't know that 1751.4mm is tall. We can only know that 
someone of a certain height is tall if we also know that everyone within a certain margin for 
error of that height is also tall, otherwise we may simply be right by accident. This seems a 
reasonable explanation of why terms have the appearance of vagueness since basically our 
certainty that we're outside of the margin for error, and thus our warrant, trails off as we get 
closer and closer to the hidden sharp borderline. It doesn't however tackle the underlying 
misgiving that a lot of people have, which is to question how any such precise boundary could 
mysteriously arise by default out of a collection of uses of the vague term. Take the term 
'zoeyly' which I believe I just coined, which is a term that picks out a certain vague section of 
the real number line. You can see roughly what numbers are zoeyly by looking at figure 2 
below.  
Figure 2 
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Now that I‟ve introduced you to this term we can have a discussion of whether a number is 
zoeyly or not. We could discuss what numbers are zoeyly and agree that 4 and 2.3874 are 
zoeyly, but 1, 5.6 and 200 are not. The epistemicist holds that there are now hidden sharp 
boundaries to the extension of zoeyly and given its definition and uses to date the suggestion 
that its extension has sharp boundaries seems completely implausible. Most do not find it 
plausible that there are sharp boundaries hidden under all vague terms and that is the major 
problem with epistemicism. 
 
 
4.2 Degree theory 
 
Similar in some respects to epistemicism is the degree theory of vagueness. This approach 
revises logic to admit degrees of truth, but maintains a commitment to hidden sharp 
boundaries between these many truth values. The simplest model introduces a third truth 
value, 'indeterminate', so that every truth evaluable statement can be true, false or 
indeterminate. This has the advantage over epistemicism that when applied to vagueness it 
respects our gut instinct that there is no fact of the matter as to whether some shades are blue 
or whether <Francis is tall> if Francis is 180cm in height. Unfortunately this was not the most 
problematic feature of epistemicism, the most problematic feature of epistemicism was its 
commitment to sharp boundary and the three valued logic approach merely replaces one sharp 
boundary with two. That doesn't look like any sort of improvement. 
 
More promising is infinitely many-valued logic which replaces true and false with infinitely 
many values of truth. These are generally represented as real numbers between 0 and 1 with 1 
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assigned to absolute truth and 0 assigned to absolute falsity. This still commits the degree 
theorist to sharp boundaries, but they can at least attempt to argue that none of their sharp 
boundaries represent significant sudden changes of truth value like those of epistemicism. 
There are sharp lines, but there are infinitely many sharp lines so that moving across them is 
more akin to moving along a continuum. That perhaps isn‟t so counter-intuitive. After all, as 
we consider shorter heights that Francis could be, he would be less tall, so it seems reasonable 
that that constant change in height should be reflected in a slow constant change in the truth 
value of <Francis is tall.> 
 
That doesn‟t seem so unreasonable until you consider that there are some truth-values which 
are far more interesting and significant than others. Keefe (2000, 92) points out that there will 
be some point at which the truth value of vague statements will go from 1 to less than 1. 
There will be a sharp boundary that marks the edge of the cloud of vagueness. There are 
replies the degree theorist could give to that, such as claiming nothing or almost nothing is 
absolutely true, but it seems at least the degree theorist will be committed to there being one 
particular point at which a vague statement is 0.5 true. Some height must be the precise point 
above which Francis would be „more tall than not tall‟ and below which he would be „more 
not tall than tall‟. Similarly there will be a pair of real numbers of which it is exactly 0.5 true 
that they are zoeyly. These interesting sharp boundaries between slightly different degrees of 
truth arising mysteriously out of our usage of the terms are implausible for the same reason 
and to my mind to the same degree as the epistemicist‟s sharp boundaries between truth and 
falsity. The thought is as Keefe puts it: -  
 
For a start, what could determine which is the correct function, setting that my coat is 
red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321? This, again, can be treated as parallel to the 
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question asked of the epistemic view about what determines the valuations fixing 
sharp boundaries to the extensions of predicates. (Keefe, 2000, 114)  
 
Aside from the shared problem of sharp boundaries the degree theory also suffers from a great 
deal of additional complexity and technically questionable logical revisionism that must also 
be counted against it. This makes degree theory relatively unattractive compared to 
epistemicism to anyone who lacks independent reasons for believing there are degrees of 
truth. 
 
 
4.3 Transvaluationism 
 
Finally let me gesture in the direction of transvaluationism. Transvaluationism is the theory 
that vague language is in fact incoherent in the way Williamson argued lead to nihilism 
regarding meaning, but that it is also a genuine phenomenon and still viable. Horgan (1995, 
97) claims that the incoherence of vague discourse, far from robbing vague language of its 
meaning, is an essential feature of working language. This is clearly quite a radical position 
and has theoretical costs as far as its revision of semantics is concerned, but one that should 
be kept in mind as a possible alternative to the other theories of vagueness. 
 
Horgan has repeatedly argued (1998, 23 and 2010, 81) that all theories of vagueness that don‟t 
admit sharp boundaries are actually implementations of transvaluationism. He has explicitly 
argued that a particular sort of supervaluationism, iterated supervaluationism, is a form of 
transvaluationism. I‟ll say more regarding that form of supervaluationism and Horgan‟s most 
recent argument that it is a form of transvaluationism in section 7.2. 
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5 The Supervaluationist Account of Higher-Order Vagueness 
 
The above simple account of supervaluationism says nothing about higher-order vagueness, 
but allows for supervaluationists to give several subtly different accounts of high-order 
vagueness with the addition of a couple of new features to the framework. 
 
 
5.1 The access relation 
 
The first thing required is an access relationship between different delineations. The access 
relation will be something like a similarity or resemblance relation that may hold between 
delineations. So if two delineations access each other they are similar in some important 
respect. Weatherson comments that “To help get clear on the picture, think that one [delineation] is 
accessible from another if the second resembles the first insome (sic) salient respects.”(2002, 42) The 
role of the access relation in supervaluationism‟s formal model is exactly analogous to that of 
the possibility relation that may hold between possible worlds in possible world semantics. It 
allows some delineations to access each other in a formally similar way to that in which 
worlds can be possible at other worlds. The exact details of the access relation will vary 
considerably between different supervaluationist models. Almost all fine details such as 
whether the relation is symmetric (Mahtani, 2008, 506) are debatable. 
 
 
5.2 The D operator 
 
In ordinary language we talk of things being 'definitely true', people being 'definitely tall' and 
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cricket balls being 'definitely red'. The concept of 'definitely' plays an important role in the 
supervaluationist account of vagueness and higher-order vagueness. It is represented in the 
supervaluationist model by a logical operator D. 
 
To borrow from Williamson: “As a first approximation, for the supervaluationist, definiteness 
is truth is truth under all sharpenings of the language consistent with what speakers have 
already fixed about its semantics” (1999, 128) This means that if p is true at all sharpenings 
then it is definitely true, or to put it another way Dp is true. So Dp is true if and only if p is 
supertrue. The truth condition for Dp is therefore that p be true at all sharpenings.  
 
The supervaluationist account of 1
st
 order vagueness in terms of the D operator can be 
expressed as follows: if p is a 1
st
 order vague sentence, then ¬Dp & ¬D¬p is true at some 
sharpenings. That simply means there are sharpenings at which p is neither 'definitely true' 
nor 'definitely not true' so at these sharpenings it is indefinite, it is vague, whether p is true or 
not. This is equivalent to saying that there are borderline cases of p and is thus equivalent to 
1
st
 order vagueness. 
 
The D operator can also be iterated to give expressions such as DDp and DDDDp. These 
should be read as “definitely definitely p” and “definitely definitely definitely definitely p” 
respectively. Later in this thesis I will be considering extreme long series of D operators so for 
notational purposes let D
n
 represent a string of n D operators where n is any natural number, 
so D
4
p is shorthand for DDDDp. Let Dset
n
p represent the set of delineations on which the truth 
of D
n
p depends. D
n
p is true if and only if D
n-1
p is true at all delineations accessed by Dset
n-1
p. 
Then we can say that across all the common supervaluational models the truth condition for 
D
n
p
 
is that D
n-1
p must be true at every member of Dset
n-1
p and every delineation accessed by 
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Dset
n-1
p. Thus the set Dset
n
p is the union of Dset
n-1
p and the set of delineations accessed by Dset
n-
1
p. So for instance Dsetp is simply the set of sharpening of p and thus DDp is true just in case 
that Dp is true at all delineations accessed by the sharpenings of p.  
  
The logic of the D operator depends on the nature of the access relation between the 
delineations. One of the key splits among supervaluationists is regarding the logic of the D 
operator and centres around whether or not Dp ⊨ DDp holds for all p. 
 
 
5.3 The S4 rule 
 
The dividing line between these two camps is the following rule: - 
 
 Dp ⊨ DDp 
 
I'll follow the convention of referring to this rule as S4 since the logic of supervaluationism is 
formally very similar to that of modal logic and in modal logic the analogous rule □p ⊨ □□p 
is known as S4. Whether S4 holds or not will depend on the behaviour of the access relation 
between delineations. I'll now look at each of these two opposed camps in turn, starting with 
those who hold that the logic for the D operator is S4 or stronger. 
 
 
5.3.1 S4 or stronger logic for D 
 
Simply put, if for all sentences p, the members of Dset
1
p only access members of Dset
1
p then 
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S4 will hold. To illustrate this let us coin a new vague
**
 term, „littleheap‟. Now if you have 6 
grains of corn then you have a littleheap of corn and if you only have 1 grain of corn then you 
don't have a littleheap of corn, but if you have 3 or 4 grains of corn then you might have a 
littleheap of corn. In other words the sharpenings of „littleheap‟ put the boundary at either 
having 3 or more grains or 4 or more grains. I'll call these by names of the form 'the 
sharpening at x' by which I mean 'the sharpening that gives the boundary for having a 
littleheap as having x or more grains'. Now let‟s say that the sharpening that places the 
boundary at 4 accesses itself and the sharpening at 3, and the sharpening at 3 only accesses 
the sharpening at 4 and itself. Let h be the sentence <You have a littleheap>. If you have 4 or 
more grains of corn, then Dh is true since it is true according to every member of Dset
1
h,
 
because Dset
1
h
 
comprises the delineations at 3 and 4. Similarly if you have 4 or more grains of 
corn, then DDh is true since it is true according to every delineation in Dset
2 
h. This is because
 
Dset
2
h
 
 also only comprises the delineations at 3 and 4, since Dset
1
h only accesses itself and so 
Dset
2
h
 
=
 
Dset
1
h. Similarly Dset
2
h only accesses itself, as it is the same set as Dset
1
h, and so Dset
3
h 
is the same set once again and so on. Therefore by induction we can see that for any natural 
numbers i and j, Dset
i
h = Dset
j
h. So for any natural number n, the truth of D
n
h relies on the 
truth of h at the same set of delineations (the delineations at 3 and 4), and so D
n
h is true if and 
only if Dh is true and thus the logic will obey S4 in the case of „littleheap‟. More generally the 
rule is that whenever Dset
1
p
 
only accesses itself the S4 rule will hold for that sentence. Thus if 
for all p, Dset
1
p
 
only accesses itself the S4 rule will hold for all p. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
**
It is contentious to claim that Littleheap is vague (Keefe, 2000, 31) since as we will see it is vague in a very 
simple and limited sense, but for the sake of creating a simple example I hope any unsympathetic readers will 
allow me to speak of it as vague. 
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5.3.2 Weaker than S4 logic for D 
 
If Dset
1
p
 
accesses delineations other then those contained in Dset
1
p,
 
then Dset
2
p may contain 
more extreme delineations than Dset
1
p. It could then be the case that the statement p will be 
true according to all the delineations contained in Dset
1
p but false according to the more 
extreme delineations contained in Dset
2
p
 
but not Dset
1
p. In that case Dp will be true but DDp 
indeterminate and therefore Dp ⊭ DDp. 
 
Going back to the example of 'littleheap', if we now assume the sharpening at 4 also accessed 
the delineation at 5, then Dset
1
h
 
would comprise the delineations at 3 and 4 but Dset
2
h would be 
comprised of the delineations at 3, 4 and 5. That being the case, if you had 4 grains of corn 
then Dh would be true but DDh false and thus Dp ⊭ DDp. 
 
 
5.4 The I operator 
 
Fine (1999, 140) defined the indefinitely operator I, read as „it is indefinite that‟, as Ip = ¬Dp 
& ¬D¬p. Ip is thus true at the borderline cases of p and if Ip is true at any delineations then p 
has 1
st
 order vagueness. Figure 3 below which roughly illustrates the boundaries of It where t 
is the statement <Francis is tall> and Francis' height increases from left to right, so at 170cm 
D¬t is true, at 180cm It is true and at 190cm Dt is true. 
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Figure 3 
 
The I operator is no more than a shorthand notation ¬Dp & ¬D¬p and so frequently ignored 
in the literature. However, the meaning of it is quite simple to understand and since some of 
the examples later in this thesis will involve series of I operators that would otherwise have to 
be written as long conjunctions of expression involving long strings of D operators, it will be 
a useful notational shorthand to bear in mind. 
 
 
5.5 The supervaluationist account of higher-order vagueness 
 
Now that the whole framework is in place the standard supervaluationist account of higher-
order vagueness is as follows. 2
nd
 order vagueness of a statement p is equivalent to the 1
st
 
order vagueness of Ip. So 2
nd
 order vagueness of p is equivalent to there being delineations at 
which ¬DIp & ¬D¬Ip is true and that is in turn the equivalent to there being delineations at 
which IIp is true. Similarly 3
rd
 order vagueness of p is equivalent to 1
st
 order vagueness of IIp 
which is equivalent to there being delineations at which IIIp is true. Let I
n
 represent a string of 
n I operators, so for example I
4
p is shorthand for IIIIp. Generally if p exhibits nth order 
vagueness then there are delineations at which I
n
p is true.  
 
 
 
D¬t is true Dt is true It is true 
175cm 185cm 170cm 180cm 190cm 
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6 The Case Against S4 or Stronger Logic for D 
 
The main problem with accounts where S4 is obeyed by D is that they appear to give rise to a 
hidden sharp boundary between cases where Dp is true and those where Dp is indeterminate 
or false. Such a sharp boundary would be a serious problem for any supervaluationist model. 
The first problem is that any such boundary is contrary to our expectations of how something 
as fluid as natural language should be structured. The second is that violating this intuition is 
the only significant flaw with the epistemic theory of vagueness to which supervaluationism 
must show itself to be superior. This section will outline where and why the apparent sharp 
boundary arises from the Stronger than S4 model. 
 
As mentioned above the supervaluationist analysis of higher-order vagueness is given in 
terms of repeated indefinitely operators. Different orders of vagueness analysed by appeal to 
different numbers of repetitions of I operators. The boundaries to set of delineations where IIp 
is true are those of 2
nd
 order vagueness etc.  Now consider the expansion of IIp: - 
 
 ¬DD¬p & ¬DDp & (¬D¬D¬p v ¬D¬Dp) 
 
Now if S4 holds then DDp is equivalent to Dp. So we can simplify the explanation to: - 
 
 ¬D¬p & ¬Dp & (¬D¬D¬p v ¬D¬Dp) 
 
There are two major problems with this. The first stems from the fact that the first two 
conjuncts  ¬D¬p & ¬Dp are the definition of Ip. That means that if IIp is true at any 
delineation then Ip is true at that delineation. So if something is a borderline borderline case 
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then it is a borderline case and that doesn't seem right. If a shade is borderline borderline blue 
then that does not mean it is borderline case of blue. Borderline borderline cases are just that, 
not borderline and not not borderline. An account of higher-order vagueness that takes 
borderline borderline as implying borderline seems to be simply wrong. 
 
The second problem is that the boundary between IIp and Dp is the same as the boundary 
between Ip and Dp. Similarly the boundary between being II¬p and D¬p is the same as the 
boundary between Ip and Dp. That means that two of the boundaries given rise to by 2
nd
 order 
vagueness are equivalent to the two boundaries of 1
st
 order vagueness. More generally since 
we can replace p in the above expansions with I
n-2
p and observe that 
 ¬DD¬I
n-2
p & ¬DDI
n-2
p & (¬D¬D¬I
n-2
p v ¬D¬DIn-2p) 
is equivalent to 
 ¬D¬I
n-2
p & ¬DI
n-2
p & (¬D¬D¬I
n-2
p v ¬D¬DIn-2p) 
and that 
 ¬D¬I
n-2
p & ¬DI
n-2
p 
is equivalent to 
 I
n-1
p 
 
From this we can deduce that half the boundaries given rise to by nth order vagueness will be 
equivalent to the boundaries given rise to by n-1 order vagueness. This means that none of the 
boundaries are actually analysed, they simply show up again in the next higher order of 
vagueness. 
 
All plausible models of supervaluationism that endorse the S4 rule also endorse the equivalent 
to modal logics S5 rule, that ¬Dp ⊨ D¬Dp. The expansion of IIp 
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 ¬D¬p & ¬Dp & (¬D¬D¬p v ¬D¬Dp) 
can therefore be expressed as 
 D¬D¬p & D¬Dp & (¬D¬D¬p v ¬D¬Dp) 
That is unsatisfiable since if the first two conjuncts in the expansion are true, then the third is 
false. There are thus no borderline borderline cases on such a model. This amounts to either a 
denial of all orders of vagueness above the 1
st
 or an admission that higher-orders of vagueness 
must be analysed by some method other than that of the normal supervaluational framework. 
 
Going back to the example of 'tall', let t again be <Francis is tall>. 'Tall' appears to be a term 
that has higher-order vagueness. There doesn't appear to be any sharp boundary between those 
heights that would make DDt true and those that make ¬DDt true. It is to my mind no more 
plausible to suggest that there is a sharp boundary between those heights that make DDt true 
and ¬DDt true than it is to suggest that there is a sharp boundary between those heights that 
make Dt true and those that make ¬Dt true. It is implausible that there should be any sharp 
boundaries in the model of t because t is not just vague but higher-order vague, the question is 
how that higher-order vagueness is to be accounted for. The problem is that the 
supervaluationist who holds that the logic for D is S4 or stronger can't provide a satisfactory 
analysis of this higher-order vagueness within their supervaluational framework. The 
framework will need expanding in some way to take into account higher-order vagueness. 
Either that or S4 or stronger logic for D should be rejected. 
 
 
6.1 Hybrid theories of vagueness 
 
One possible way for the framework to be expanded would be to adopt a hybrid theory of 
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vagueness. Most obviously a theory could be adopted where 1
st
 order vagueness is analysed 
by appeal to supervaluationism, but where higher-order vagueness is to be analysed in 
accordance with some different theory. The most obvious candidate for such a hybrid theory 
is one where there is a sharp boundary between Dp and ¬Dp and higher-order vagueness is 
merely epistemic. The problem for such a theory is that for many terms it seems no more 
plausible that there are hidden sharp boundaries for Dp than there are for p. It is no more 
plausible that higher-order vagueness is purely epistemic than it is that vagueness is 
epistemic. This means that such a hybrid supervaluational/epistemic theory of vagueness 
would inherit epistemicism's major flaw. This might not be a huge problem if epistemicism 
had other major problems that the hybrid theory avoided, but this doesn't appear to be the 
case. Rather epistemicism is a theory that, aside from its commitment to sharp boundaries, is a 
fairly attractive theory in its simplicity and lack of major technical problems. Epistemicism is 
a relatively simple theory that is technically very solid and if you're willing to bite the bullet 
and admit sharp boundaries there seems little reason to reject it in favour of a more complex 
theory involving supervaluationism. 
 
The general problem that dogs all hybrid theories is that they tend to inherit most of the 
problems and complexity of both. Unless it can be shown that there is a hybrid theory that has 
significantly fewer problems than either of its parts then it will inevitably fall victim to an 
argument from simplicity that one of its parts is simpler and has the same or fewer problems. 
I've argued this explicitly in the case of an epistemic hybrid of supervaluationism and it seems 
unlikely that any other hybrid would fare any better when the argument against is so simple 
and generic. If there were a theory of vagueness that could explain higher-order vagueness 
effectively but struggled to give a good account of 1
st
 order vagueness, then attempting to 
construct a hybrid theory would seem a promising project but there is no such theory that I am 
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aware of. 
 
In section 7.2 we will look at a way in which supervaluationists who endorse S4 or stronger 
logic for D can extend the supervaluational framework to get around this problem and give a 
supervaluational analysis of higher-order vagueness. For the moment however, let us put S4 
and stronger logic aside and look at a problem that affects supervaluationist accounts where 
the logic of D is weaker than S4. 
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7 Williamson on Potential Sharp Boundaries 
 
It seems then that we should probably reject supervaluationism with stronger than S4 logic for 
D and consider instead a supervaluationism with a logic for the D operator that's weaker than 
S4 so as to avoid the problematic sharp boundaries that arise out of the S4 and S5 rules. 
However, Williamson in considering potential sharp boundaries in supervaluationism 
observed that even with logic for D that is weaker than S4 the supervaluationist model may 
still turn out to contain sharp boundaries and thus might still turn out to be inferior to 
epistemicism for this reason. 
 
The problem revolves around a new operator defined in terms of D that I shall refer to as D*. 
Williamson (1994, 160) defined D
*
 such that D*p is the infinite conjunction: p & Dp & DDp 
& DDDp & ... . Williamson points out that the logic of this will be S4. This is the case 
because if we were to expand out D
*
D
*
p into the infinite conjunction then every term in the 
expansion would also appear in the infinite conjunction represented by D
*
p. 
 
To see why D*D*p expands out to become equivalent to D*p, let‟s quickly run through the 
first few steps of such an expansion exercise. 
 
 D*D*p 
substituting the first D* with its expansion gives 
 D*p & D*Dp & D*DDp & … 
which if the first D* is in turn substituted by its expansions gives 
 p & Dp & DDp & DDDp & … & D*Dp & D*DDp & … 
and substituting out the next D* gives 
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 p & Dp & DDp & DDDp & … Dp & DDp & DDDp & … & D*Dp & D*DDp & … 
which once the repeated terms are dropped is 
 p & Dp & DDp & DDDp & … & D*DDp & … 
and so on until all the infinitely many D* terms are expanded to give 
 p & Dp & DDp & DDDp & … 
which is the definition of D*p. Thus the two expressions are equivalent and since trivially D
*
p 
⊨ D*p, if we substitute D*D*p for D*p on the right hand side we get the result D*p ⊨ D*D*p 
which is an S4 rule for D*. 
 
Furthermore, since the longest chain of operators in D
*
p is infinite in length, the only 
difference between DD
*
p and D
*
p is that the expansion of DD
*
p does not contain the term p. 
However, it does contain the term Dp and trivially Dp ⊨ p because common sense dictates 
that if p is definitely true then it must at least be true. This means that the only conjunct in the 
expansion of DD
*
p but not in the expansion of D
*
p is implied by one of the conjuncts of 
DD
*
p, so we have the result that D
*
p ⊨ DD*p. This means that any vagueness of the boundary 
between D*p and ¬D*p can't be analysed by adding another D operator. This means that 
using the established framework supervaluationism is unable to give any analysis of 
vagueness in D
*
p and so it would seem that the supervaluationist must admit that D
*
p is 
precise, or at least that their model is inadequate for analysing its vagueness. Williamson does 
however also suggest two possible replies that a supervaluationist could give to his example 
without admitting sharp boundaries. 
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7.1 Williamson’s first reply – near impossible standard 
 
The first reply the supervaluationist could give is that D
*
p is never or hardly ever true if p is 
vague, that D
*
p is an almost impossible standard that will only be met if there is some limit to 
the medium over which the vague term has its extension. So going back to the example of 
height, if Francis is x meters in height and t is again <Francis is tall>, then there are no 
positive finite values of x for which either D
*
t true or D
*
¬t are true. In some cases this fits 
quite closely with our intuitions, for instance in the case of the term 'bald'. One might be 
intuitively attracted to the idea that one is only D
*
 bald if one has no hair at all. Dorr (2010, 
555) takes this line even further and argues that D
*
p can never be true for any p under any 
circumstances, so that even a man with no hair at all isn't D
*
 bald. A discussion of Dorr's 
argument is beyond the scope of this paper but whatever its merits, that D* is a near 
impossible standard is a position that attracts some philosophers. Leaving Dorr's argument 
aside then the more moderate position suggested by Williamson (1994, 160-161), that D
*
p is 
hardly ever true strikes me as more intuitive and it is a strong enough position to get the full 
argumentative force of the reply so that is the position I'll discuss here. If Dorr's argument is 
correct and the supervaluationist must admit that count-intuitively even men with no hair at 
all aren't D* bald, then that is so much the worse for supervaluationism since it turns out the 
theory must do even greater violence to our intuitions. 
 
Looking more closely at what it means for D*t to be a near impossible standard we see that 
for any finitely large value of x there will be a finite number m such that D
m
t
 
is false. So in 
other words if you put enough D operators in front of t, then no matter what Francis' height is 
the statement will be false. I find this exceedingly counter-intuitive, my intuition is that if say 
Francis grew to be 30 foot in height, then no matter how many D operators were put in front 
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of statement <Francis is tall> is would always be true because at 30 foot in height Francis is 
so far above the vague borderline of 'tall' that no amount of D operators could generate a 
statement that was anything less than definitely true. It is no vague matter that a 30 foot man 
is absolutely, completely and utterly tall! Imagine you have in your care a small child and you 
meet a 30 foot tall man in the street, the child asks “That man was tall, wasn‟t he?” and you 
would of course agree. Now imagine the child asks “That man was definitely tall, wasn‟t he?” 
to which you truthfully agree and then “That man was definitely definitely tall, wasn‟t he?” 
and so on until hours later the child is repeating “definitely” hundreds of times, each time 
being met with your exasperated assent. Surely the child‟s interrogation is pointless since no 
matter how many times it repeats “definitely”, if you answer truthfully your answer will 
always be the same. The supervaluationist has to deny this, they have to hold that if you are to 
answer the child perfectly truthfully at some point you need to say “Oh no, he wasn‟t 
definitely… definitely tall.” That seems to be a mistake, a 30 foot man is tall and part of what 
makes the child‟s line of questioning so annoying is that the answer will always be “yes” and 
the child cannot expect to learn anything more from pestering you so. What's more, if these 
intuitions hold for a human who is a mere 30 foot in height then surely it is the case for a 
human who is many light years in height, and yet these are things that the supervaluationist 
must deny if they wish to use this reply. 
 
The near impossible standard reply also entails that at the other end of the scale for any 
finitely small value of x there will be a finite number m such that D
m
¬t
 
is false. So if Francis 
were a human being less than 1mm in height, then then there would be some finite number of 
D operators m such that if D is repeated m times in front of ¬t then it will be false. This is 
again extremely counter-intuitive; intuitively any human less than 1mm in height is absolutely 
not tall and that this is simply not a vague matter. 
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The problem is perhaps even more acute when you consider the case of the colour term blue. 
Let b be the statement <This shade is not blue>. It seems plausible that for any shade of green 
between what we might pick out as a paradigmatic green and the blue-green border D
*
b isn't 
true, but it is much less plausible that D
*
b isn't true of a shade between paradigmatic green 
and the green-yellow borderline. It is less plausible still that  D
*
b isn't true for any shade of 
yellow and less plausible still that is isn't true of any shade of red. However the problem 
doesn't even end there, because the term 'visible light' is also vague and lacks a sharp 
extension. There isn't any sharp boundary at the edge of what wavelengths of electromagnetic 
radiation are 'visible light', even for individuals there is no sharp cut off, merely a drop off in 
the probability of detection of photons as their wavelength increases (Hardin, 1988, 26). 
There simply isn't any natural sharp boundary at which D
*
b can switch to true without 
introducing just the kind of arbitrary hidden sharp boundary that this response is meant to 
avoid. That means D
*
b must surely still be false and remain false through the spectra of infra-
red, microwaves and into that of radio waves. So it seems that if this reply is to be adopted 
then the supervaluationist must hold that D
*
b is false for radio waves. According to this 
account it seems that radio waves aren't D
*
 not blue and that seems to not only be counter-
intuitive but seems to be almost on a par with a category mistake since it assigns something 
invisible the property of being not absolutely not blue. It seems little better to assign colour to 
sounds than to radio waves since neither can ever be seen by anything that speaks English. I 
can see two possible replies to this line of reasoning. First the supervaluationist could point 
out that there isn't anything akin to a category mistake, because if the extension of 'visible 
light' is also vague then radio waves aren't D
*
 not visible. That seems correct within the model 
but still rather odd considering no human being could ever see them. The second would be to 
reply that there is a sharp boundary at which D
*
 not visible and D
*
b both become true, 
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perhaps at the longest wavelength of light that has in fact ever been seen? Either way the 
results are still very counter-intuitive. 
 
 
7.2 Williamson’s second reply – iterated supervaluationism  
 
The other solution Williamson proposes is to claim that D
*
 is still vague and only appears 
precise because it can't be used to measure its own vagueness. He draws the analogy to a 
cloud being said to have an exact length because it is exactly as long as itself (Williamson, 
1994, 160). To understand exactly what this analogy means we need to consider what would 
happen if we were asked to give the length of a certain cloud in a language which only had a 
single length term, the cloudymetre, which was defined as being the length of the very same 
cloud. All we could say in such a language was that the cloud was exactly one cloudymetre 
long, so in the absence of any other description or knowledge of the definition of a 
cloudymetre the person who asked us the question might reasonably assume that the cloud 
had exact length. This would be quite incorrect since in fact the appearance of precision is 
merely an illusion created by the vagueness of the term exactly matching the vagueness of the 
object of the description. The case is analogous for D operators since for any finite string of n 
D operators it is trivially true that D
n
p ⊨ Dnp, and so if we are asked to give the extension of 
D
n
p in a language with only n D operators it might appear precise because in the terms 
available to describe its extension it is best described as being exactly D
n
p. So if we don't 
analyse D
n
p using more than n D operators we might get the illusion of precision and so we 
can say that the vagueness of D
n
p can't be captured using less than n+1 D operators. 
 
So perhaps D
*
 is also vague and similarly needs a new vague operator, call it D2, to capture its 
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vagueness. D and D
*
 are both part of the metalanguage used to discuss natural language, the 
central claim of this reply is that the metalanguage is also vague and any analysis of its 
vagueness needs to take place in a metametalanguage of which D2 is a term. D2 can't be any 
part of the infinite series of definitely operators that are used in the definition of D
*
, because 
firstly it wouldn't be able to capture the vagueness of D
* 
since it couldn't capture its own 
vagueness, and secondly the D operators and D
*
 are in the metalanguage and D2 isn't. D2 
appears in the metametalanguage but not the metalanguages, D2 is a completely new D 
operator that is able to capture the vagueness of the metalanguage because it is outside of the 
metalanguage. However, like all D operators it is vague and unable to capture its own 
vagueness which is the vagueness of the metametalanguage, and so to capture the vagueness 
of D2 a new vague operator D3 in the metametametalanguage is needed and so on without 
end. That means that there is an infinite hierarchy of metalanguages above the object language 
and every one of them is vague and needs to one above for its analysis.  
 
Keefe (2000, 210) points out that actually the same response can be given to the earlier 
criticism of supervaluationism with stronger than S4 logic for D. Recall that 
supervaluationism with stronger than S4 logic for D was alleged to have admitted sharp 
boundaries and failed to give an account of higher-order vagueness. However, if D is taken to 
be vague because the metalanguage is vague, then higher-orders of vagueness within the 
supervaluationist model with stronger than S4 logic for D can be analysed as the vagueness of 
the hierarchy of metalanguages. So 1
st
 order vagueness is vagueness in the object language 
and is captured by analysis in the metalanguage using the D operator, and 2
nd
 order vagueness 
is vagueness in the metalanguage and is captured by analysis in the metametalanguage using 
the D2 operator and so on so that nth order vagueness is vagueness in the meta
n-1
language and 
is captured using the Dn operator. This has the advantage that the model of supervaluationism 
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with S4 or stronger logic for D is simpler than for weaker than S4 logic, so if the move to an 
infinite hierarchy of vague metalanguages has to be made it should be made in response to the 
problem of sharp boundaries in the S4 model rather than in response to the problem of sharp 
boundaries associated with Williamson‟s D* operator. This is the type of supervaluationism 
Keefe endorses. 
 
Supervaluationist models that employ this move to an infinite hierarchy of vague 
metalanguages are the type of supervaluationism that Horgan refers to as „iterative 
supervaluationism‟ and has repeatedly argued that is it a form of transvaluationism (1998, 23 
and 2010, 83). Horgan‟s most recent argument starts by questioning why it is that an 
epistemically ideal agent couldn‟t assign final semantic statues to all statements and thus 
discover sharp lines within the iterated supervaluationist model. He claims that the only 
plausible explanation for why this is the case is because it obeys principles that commit it 
being a form of transvaluationism. If the argument is correct then the iterative 
supervaluationists must accept either sharp boundaries or transvaluationist style logical 
incoherence. Horgan‟s argument is by inference to the only plausible explanation and thus 
open to reply from a supervaluationist who can come up with an alternative plausible 
explanation. Yet in spite of that weakness it does seem hard to see what reply a 
supervaluationist might come up with and so it does look quite strong. I find it very hard to 
see what principled response the supervaluationist could that wouldn‟t commit them to either 
problematic sharp boundaries or transvaluationism. Given how unattractive both the logical 
incoherence of transvaluationism and sharp boundaries to vague terms are for most 
philosophers this must count as a reason to be wary of iterated supervaluationism. 
 
Taking Williamson‟s second reply leaves the supervaluationist with the hard task of coming 
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up with a reply to Horgan‟s challenge. If no such reply can be found then they will be forced 
to accept the logical incoherence of transvaluationism, which unless they are convinced by 
Horgan‟s arguments that this incoherence is benign looks like a high price to pay. If 
supervaluationism is to avoid the force of Horgan‟s argument and the threat of the logical 
incoherence of transvaluationism that it entails, then it seems they should adopt Williamson‟s 
first reply that D* is a near impossible standard. This reply as I said seems extremely counter-
intuitive to me but not everyone shares this intuition and such people will presumably be able 
to accept this reply with ease. Therefore what the critic of supervaluationism needs is to find a 
non-extreme sharp boundary, a boundary that the supervaluationist can‟t simply dismiss by 
shoving it off to infinity. How we might search for such a non-extreme sharp boundary will be 
the focus of the next section. 
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8 The Search for a Non-Extreme Sharp Boundary 
 
 
The critic of supervaluationism should in response to the „near impossible standard‟ reply 
look for sharp boundaries somewhere in the middle of the range of vagueness, since such 
boundaries cannot be explained away as only occurring at infinity or be so easily dismissed 
by claiming they never arise at all. The remainder of this section will concentrate on arguing 
that there are infinitely many such sharp boundaries. 
 
 
8.1 Infinitely many boundaries 
 
One feature of D
n
p is that although it can have any number of boundaries it is also the case 
that in most cases D
n
p will have the same number of boundaries as D
n-1
p, and so for many 
vague statements in natural language D
n
p has only one or two boundaries. D
n
p has one 
boundary in cases like that of D
n
t where it is true in all cases where Francis is over a certain 
height. D
n
p has two boundaries in cases such as those involving colour predicates blue, so in 
the previous example where b is <This shade is not blue>, D
n
b is false for some vague set of 
delineations roughly around light of wavelength 465nm
††
. I
n
p on the other hand doesn't share 
this feature, rather for many statements in natural language Ip has two or four boundaries, but 
for those same statements I
2
p typically has four or eight boundaries, I
3
p typically has eight or 
sixteen boundaries and so on. Generally I
n
p typically has twice as many boundaries as I
n-1
p. If 
we let x be the number of boundaries to the sets of delineations at which Ip is true, then I
n
p 
will typically have 2
n-1
x boundaries. To see why this is the case it is probably easiest to first 
                                                 
††
This is true for small values of n at least, for higher values the supervaluationist should probably claim that D
n
b 
is false for all wavelengths of light. 
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examine figure 4 below that gives a graphical representation of the boundaries of It, IIt and 
IIIt. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Because t is higher-order vague It has vague boundaries, so IIt is true at both the boundaries 
of It. Now for each distinct extension where IIt is true, it has both an upper and a lower 
boundary so it has twice as many boundaries as It. Similarly IIIt is true at each of the 
boundaries of IIt and has upper and lower boundaries for each of these distinct extensions and 
so has twice as many boundaries as IIt and four times the number of It. Following this 
reasoning we can then see that in general I
n+1
t will have twice as many boundaries as I
n
t. 
Combine the facts that It has two boundaries and I
n+1
t has twice as many boundaries as I
n
t and 
we get the result that I
n
t will have 2
n
 boundaries. Looking at figure 4 once more a quick count 
shows that this does indeed hold for the first three orders of vagueness depicted. 
 
However, as we've noted Ip could have any number of boundaries
‡‡
, so to arrive at a more 
general formula for the number of boundaries for I
n
p from the result that the formula for It is 
2
n
, we need to divide that formula by 2 because that is the number of boundaries It happens to 
                                                 
‡‡
 For an extreme example where Ip has infinitely many boundaries consider the vague proposition <Cos z is 
high>, this will be true when z is 0, 2π, 4π etc and indefinitely true at two sets of points around each of those 
infinitely many values. 
D¬t Dt It 
175cm 185cm 170cm 180cm 190cm 
IIt DIt 
DDIt IIIt 
 
IIIt 
 
IIt 
 
IIIt 
 
IIIt 
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have, and then multiply by x, the number of boundaries there are to Ip. This is still far from a 
completely general formula since on some models there may be cases where I
n
p has greater or 
fewer than twice as many boundaries as I
n-1
p, but this formula does hold for all plausible 
models of natural language terms like 'tall' and 'blue'. Now for all vague statements x will be 
greater than or equal to 1 because x corresponds to the number of boundaries there are to the 
1
st
 order vague boundaries, so if there are any vague boundaries then there must be at least 
one boundary to those boundaries. Thus since x is non-zero and positive, as n tends to infinity 
so does 2
n-1
x. This means that for most vague statements I
∞
p will have an infinite number of 
boundaries. 
 
It may be claimed that some of these strings will eventually not be true at any delineations. 
However it still seems that the number of boundaries that this supervaluational model gives 
rise to will be infinite, or as many as the underlying medium over which the vague term has 
its extension allows. So for example in the case of the vague term „flock‟ as applied to birds, it 
would seem likely that there will be at least as many boundaries as there might be birds. The 
alternative is that at some order of vagueness the number of boundaries stops increasing at all. 
Since each vague boundary requires at least two boundaries in higher-order vagueness to be 
analysed, that would imply that higher-order vagueness has cut out and we have reached a 
state of precision. The supervaluationist should not admit that vagueness cuts out at any order, 
because if higher-order vagueness cuts out then we have precision in the boundaries at that 
point and thus sharp boundaries which is ultimately what the critic of supervaluationism is 
aiming to prove. 
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8.2 The distribution of the boundaries 
 
The supervaluationist can also point out that if I
n
p is expressed purely in terms of D operators, 
then one of the terms in the formula is ¬D
n
p and so as n tends to infinity that will become 
¬D
∞
p. This will give reason for supervaluationists like Dorr who claim that D
*
t is an 
impossible standard to claim that the infinite number of boundaries to I
∞
t will be spread over 
the entire range of heights from 0cm to infinity. If the range over which the infinite number of 
boundaries is spread is also infinitely, then the vague extension of each may in fact be finite. 
This would be an effective reply if the distribution of the boundaries was unknown. However, 
although the range of all the boundaries generated by I
∞
t may be infinite, we have a pretty 
good idea as to the location of some subsets of these boundaries. Looking back at figure 4 you 
can see that the boundaries, if they exist, of any string of the form DD...DIIt will be around 
roughly 175cm for the lower case of IIt or 185cm for the higher case of IIt. This is because 
they can't move outside the vague range of IIt as D operators are added, since DIIt ⊨ IIt. 
Similarly we know that all the boundaries to sets of heights at which strings of the form ...DIt 
are true will fall between these two values since DIt ⊨ ¬IIt, and as figure 4 illustrated the 
range where DIt is true is between the two ranges over which IIt is true. It appears therefore 
that an infinite number of boundaries, those to areas where strings of the form …DIt are true, 
fall inside a roughly 10cm range. 
 
 
8.3 Infinitely sharp boundaries 
 
Furthermore, all these boundaries that arise from the supervaluational analysis of the 
vagueness of t are ordered. Take for example the case of boundaries at the level of 2
nd
 order 
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vagueness. As you can see in figure 5 below, the boundary between DD¬t and IIt is lower 
than that between IIt and Dit, and this has to be the case. Consider for a moment the 
alternative, if say the vague boundary between DD¬t and IIt was higher than IIt and DIt. Then 
there would be delineations at which DIt would be true, but IIt and DD¬t would both be 
indeterminate as it would be on the vague boundary between those two. That is impossible 
because DIt implies ¬IIt and ¬DD¬t, so anything that is DIt cannot be on the DD¬t | IIt 
borderline and so the vague boundary between DD¬t and IIt can‟t extend higher than the 
vague boundary between IIt and DIt. Similar reasoning will apply in all other cases, so a 
similar ordering will hold no matter how long the strings become. The boundaries may of 
course overlap since they‟re vague, but they must also maintain their order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the supervaluationist all of these boundaries are vague and for the sake of 
argument let us suppose that that is indeed the case. There is a problem with having an infinite 
number of vague boundaries between the two regions where IIt is true. They can't be 
identically located because they have to maintain their order, but they also all have to fit into 
an approximately 10cm range. So either (1) the vague boundaries are finitely wide but the 
differences in the vague locations of the boundaries must be infinitely small, or (2) the 
boundaries themselves must be infinitely narrow. 
 
IIt DIt IIt 
 
DDt 
 
 
175cm 185cm 170cm 180cm 190cm 
DD¬t 
 
Figure 5 
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Now let‟s look at (1) in more detail. Let u, v and w be three extremely long, 10100 say, chains 
of ¬, D and I operators such that ut, vt and wt are true at adjacent regions so they define two 
boundaries ut | vt and is vt | wt. Suppose these two boundaries are vague and have some small 
finite extension, but they differ in location by some far smaller extension so that they overlap 
almost entirely. In that case, since Ivt & D¬ut is only true at the region that is on the vt | wt 
boundary but not the ut | vt boundary, the set of delineations at which it is true that Ivt & D¬ut 
will have a far smaller extension than either boundary. Now if the difference between the 
vague locations of ut | vt and vt | wt were infinitely small, then the extension of the region at 
which Ivt & D¬ut is true must be infinitely small and Ivt & D¬ut | ¬(Ivt & D¬ut) will be an 
infinitely thin borderline. Therefore (1) implies (2), so the supervaluationist must accept that 
there are infinitely many infinitely sharp vague boundaries. 
 
An infinitely sharp vague boundary in some quantifiably medium such as height is very 
similar to an irrational number such as π. Just like π it can't be given a precise finite decimal 
explanation, but at every stage it has a location on the number line precise enough that there is 
a determinate next digit in its decimal expansion. So for π, if a mathematician with a 
computer were asked for the first 6 figures of π she could calculate that the answer is 3.14159, 
and if she were asked for the next digit then she could calculate that the answer is 2, and if 
asked for the eighth digit she could calculate that it is 6 and so on. What she couldn't do is to 
at any point give the precise decimal value of π, but at every stage she could give the next 
number in the expansion. An infinitely sharp vague boundary is similar. If the 
supervaluationist account is correct and we could somehow get past the epistemic constraints, 
then if someone were to ask the location of one particular boundary of I
∞
t in cm then we 
could tell them to as many figures as they required. The only thing we couldn't do is ever give 
a precise finite decimal location for it. 
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If this is the case then it puts the supervaluationist in real trouble. It doesn't give the precise 
boundaries that epistemicism admits, but the intuitive difference between a precise boundary 
and one that it infinitely sharp seems to be almost non-existent. The intuitive problem with 
precise boundaries is that to suggest that the addition of one atom to the top of Francis' head 
could make any difference to the semantic value of anything related to the analysis of the 
statement <Francis is tall>. Such an addition is completely imperceptible, so it seems wrong 
to suggest that such an addition could make the difference between Francis being taller or 
shorter than Ivt & D¬ut. In this crucial respect an infinitely sharp boundary is as bad as a 
precise one since either way one tiny step down the Sorites series will make the difference. 
 
 
8.4 One infinitely sharp boundary 
 
One reply that the supervaluationist could try to make to the above is that past a certain order 
of vagueness there are simply no more definite cases. Everything is indefinite except for those 
things that are true or false at all delineations. For instance, if we assume D*p is taken to be 
an impossible standard then ¬D*p is true at all delineations. The argument could go that past a 
certain point everything is indefinitely the case and ultimately I
∞
p is true at every delineation, 
so at the level of infinite-order vagueness there no boundaries because everything is perfectly 
indefinite. This might seem fairly plausible at first glance, but the problem is that I
∞
p is 
simply shorthand for its expansion in terms of D operators. Recall that Ip is simply shorthand 
for ¬Dp & ¬D¬p and so IIp is just shorthand for ¬DDp & ¬DD¬p & (¬D ¬Dp v ¬D ¬D¬p) 
etc. So when each I operator in I
∞
p is replaced by the equivalent in terms of D operators and 
the result is expanded out it becomes an infinite disjunction and we can still ask about the 
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boundaries between the different ways of fulfilling the requirement of the disjunction. There 
will still be infinitely many sharp boundaries between the different sets of delineations at 
which different combinations of disjuncts are true. 
 
It will perhaps be clearer if we look at one particular infinitely small set of delineations that 
must in turn have infinitely sharp boundaries. This set, let‟s call it L, is the set of all 
delineations at which the following infinite conjunction is true: ¬Dt & ¬D¬Dt & ¬D¬D¬Dt 
& ¬D¬D¬D¬Dt ... Now ¬Dt will be true if Francis is below the height that would make him 
definitely tall, so it‟s true if Francis is below roughly 184cm. ¬D¬Dt on the other hand will 
be true if Francis is above the height that would make D¬Dt definitely true, so let us say for 
the sake of argument, if Francis is above roughly 182cm. ¬D¬D¬Dt is true as long as Francis 
is below the height that would make D¬D¬Dt true. That's a lower height than is necessary to 
make Dt true, so the requirement that ¬Dt is true for all members of L doesn't actually restrict 
the set at all. Similarly ¬D¬D¬D¬Dt is a more restrictive standard than ¬D¬Dt and so on. If 
we look at each pair of terms in the conjunction we can also define further sets based just on 
the conjunction of two successive pairs in the series, so let L
1
 be the set of heights that would 
make ¬Dt & ¬D¬Dt true and L
2
 be the set of heights that would make ¬D¬Dt & ¬D¬D¬Dt 
true, etc. Now at each stage the set of heights that would make each L
n
 true is smaller than the 
set of heights that would make L
n-1
 true since they are defined on the basis of greater 
standards of indefiniteness at each stage. 
 
Now clearly no delineation can definitely be a member of any of these sets since no 
delineation can definitely adhere to any of the conditions of the conjunction else it would be 
violation of one of the other conditions and this means the set must be vague
§§
. However, as 
                                                 
§§
 I owe this point to a conversation with Cian Dorr. 
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vague as the set is we can still ask about its size and since at each step along the conjunction it 
becomes smaller and the conjunction is infinite in length, either the size of that L is infinitely 
small or it has a finite size, but the differences in sizes of successive members of the L
n
 series 
will tend to be infinitely small as n tends to infinity. Now if the set is infinitely small, then its 
boundaries will be infinitely sharp and so supervaluationist has to admit to infinitely sharp 
boundaries. Alternatively if L is finite, then as n tends to infinity the extension of the region of 
heights at which L
n-1
 is true but L
n
 false will tend to be infinitely small, and so L will again 
have infinitely sharp boundaries. 
 
The supervaluationist could perhaps reply that in fact the set is empty and that once again we 
have defined an impossible standard that nothing meets. However, even if that happens to be 
true in this particular case, it can't be a general reply since the conjunction is nothing more 
than one element of the expansion of I
∞
t and to claim that I
∞
t is an impossible standard would 
be nothing more than to deny infinite higher-order vagueness. Denying infinite higher-order 
vagueness would be a problem for the supervaluationist because in that case sharp boundaries 
will be admitted at the order at which higher-order vagueness cuts out. 
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9 Problematic Non-Extreme Sharp Boundaries 
 
Supervaluationism is of course built on the idea that vague terms are to be analysed with 
regard to their sharp delineations, so perhaps the fact that each of the vague boundaries are, at 
the level of infinite-order vagueness, made up of an infinite number of sharp boundaries is 
nothing problematic. After all these aren't the boundaries we're interested in when we wonder 
whether Francis is tall or some patch of colour is blue. These are boundaries in infinite-order 
vagueness and perhaps it is just unproblematic for boundaries in infinite-order vagueness to 
be infinitely sharp. Perhaps that's just to be expected and isn't problematic in the same way as 
sharp boundaries in 1
st 
or 2
nd
 order vagueness. 
 
Such a line of argument seems fairly plausible when considering such abstract boundaries as 
those of L or as arbitrary as Ivt & D¬ut | ¬(Ivt & D¬ut) . However, there are other boundaries 
that arise out of the model that seem far more clearly problematic. This section will 
concentrate on picking out problematic sharp boundaries in the weaker than S4 
supervaluationist models of the vagueness of t and arguing that whatever the exact details of 
the model it must give rise to one such problematic sharp boundary. If it can be argued that 
weaker than S4 models of supervaluationism admit a boundary as problematic as that 
admitted by epistemicism, then supervaluationism is in real trouble since it looks like on 
either model it shares the major weakness of epistemicism. 
 
Let us start by looking at figure 6 below which illustrates the central portions of the „tall‟ 
boundary structure at each of the first three orders of vagueness where It, DIt and DDIt are 
true. With each additional D operator that area is shown as decreasing in width and indeed 
that will be the case. That decreasing structure would continue if the diagram was extended to 
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cover higher-orders of vagueness. Depending on the details of the model D
∞
It will either: be 
true at an infinitely small region of points; won't be true anywhere; or it will be true at a finite 
region of points. In the next three subsections I‟ll run through each of these scenarios in turn 
and argue that they each give rise to at least one interesting sharp boundary. 
 
Figure 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1 D
∞
It is true at an infinitely small region of heights 
 
The first case is when D
∞
It is true at an infinitely small region of heights. This fits in well 
with the position that D* is a near impossible standard since D
*
It would only be true at this 
infinitely small region of heights as well. The problem is that on this scenario, because D
∞
It is 
true at an infinitely small region, then that region will constitute an infinitely sharp boundary 
at the most indefinitely tall height. An infinitely sharp boundary such that if Francis is 0.1mm 
above that height he can be said to be 'more tall than not tall', and if he is 0.1mm below that 
height then he can be said to be 'more not tall than tall'. This isn‟t identical to the type of sharp 
boundary epistemicism admits that divides simply „tall‟ from „not tall‟, but the difference 
between that type of sharp boundary and this one doesn‟t seem that great, certainly not great 
enough for it not to be a problem for supervaluationism.  
 
It 
175cm 185cm 170cm 180cm 190cm 
DIt 
DDIt 
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Firstly both boundaries mark a sudden change in truth value for something which intuitively 
shouldn‟t change suddenly. For epistemicism one extra micron in height might make Francis 
tall whereas for supervaluationism that one extra micron in height might make Francis more 
tall than not tall. „More tall than not tall‟ is a more complex notion than simply „tall‟ and not 
one we are so prone to consider, but it is hardly an alien concept and it still seems as wrong 
that it should have an infinitely sharp cut-off as it is for „tall‟. 
 
Secondly the problem with sharp boundaries isn‟t so much that they admit sharp change in 
truth value from true to false, but that they introduce any sharp features at all into something 
that seems completely vague. Recall that the degree theory of vagueness also eliminated the 
stark change from true to false for simple vague statements like t, but it did so at the expense 
of introducing a possibly infinite number of sharp boundaries that marked infinitely small 
changes in truth value. This was still judged to be problematic on the basis that it was still 
introducing interesting sharp lines, such as the line where t would be 0.5 true, where there are 
no such sharp lines found in natural language. 
 
The degree theorist‟s sharp boundary above which t is more than 0.5 true marks the dividing 
line at which Francis would be „more tall than not tall‟ and below which he would be „more 
not tall than tall‟. This is the type of interesting infinitely sharp boundary that 
supervaluationism was meant to avoid. However on this model of supervaluationism, where 
the logic for D is weaker than S4 and D
∞
It is true at an infinitely small region, this is exactly 
the type of sharp boundary that is introduced. That degree theory‟s 0.5 line is precise and 
supervaluationism‟s line is merely infinitely sharp hardly seems like a significant advantage. 
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9.2 D
∞
It isn't true at any height 
 
In the second case D
∞
It isn‟t true at any height. This would be the case if we accept that 
nothing can be D* true since D
∞
It ⊨ D*It. Consider figure 7 and notice how depicted in this 
way the boundaries that arise at successive orders of vagueness form two almost tree-like 
structures. If D
∞
It isn‟t true at any height then the gap between these two trees will disappear 
and the branches will at some order of vagueness meet. 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
 
Crucially, if and when the two trees do meet, they will at the infinite order of vagueness have 
an infinitely sharp boundary between them and this is the boundary that I wish to draw your 
attention to as problematic for this model. Consider the three operator case again and let‟s 
assume for the sake of argument that DDIt is an impossible standard, then the boundary 
pattern would look like this:- 
 
DDD¬t| IIIt | DIIt | IIIt | IIIt | DIIt | IIIt |DDDt 
 
There is a clear central boundary between the two extensions of IIIt around which the regions 
It 
175cm 185cm 170cm 180cm 190cm 
IIt 
IIIt 
 
IIIt 
 
IIt 
 
IIIt 
 
IIIt 
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and boundaries are symmetrical
***
. Now as we move in from both ends, clearly t is more 
indefinite in the regions where DIIt is true than in the end sections where IIIt is true, and 
similarly t is more indefinite in the central regions where IIIt is true than in either of the 
regions where DIIt is true. The indefiniteness of t increases as we move in from the ends 
towards the centre and each boundary that is crossed as we move towards the centre marks a 
move towards greater indefiniteness of t. The most indefinite point is the boundary between 
the two central regions since the pattern of increasing and decreasing indefiniteness pivots 
around this point. 
 
The supervaluationist may reply to this by simply disagreeing with my assertion that the 
central boundary marks the point of greatest indefiniteness and claim that since both regions 
of IIIt are in some sense as indefinite as each other the boundary between them is nothing 
special. However, this is a moot point when considering the important case in which the 
regions are defined not by chains of only three operators but with infinitely long chains of 
operators. This is the case because as the number of regions tends to infinity they must also 
tend to be infinitely thin and therefore the two regions at which t is most indefinite when 
taken together will still have infinitely small extension, and so they will still define an 
infinitely sharp point of greatest indefiniteness. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
***
  It would be a mistake to think that because IIIt is true at both of these areas they can blend seamlessly 
together, because if the I operators are replaced with the equivalent statements in terms of D operators then IIIt 
becomes: - 
 
¬DDDt & ¬DDD¬t & (¬DD¬Dt v ¬DD¬D¬t) & ((¬D¬D¬Dt & ¬D¬D¬D¬t) v (¬D¬DDt v ¬D¬DD¬t))  
 
The difference between these areas is that at one area the conjunct (¬DD¬Dt v ¬DD¬D¬t) is satisfied by 
¬DD¬Dt being true and at the other by ¬DD¬D¬t being true. 
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9.2.1 Picking out the most indefinite point 
 
However, at the infinite order of vagueness some strings of operators won‟t be true at any 
delineation, indeed by assumption D
∞
It won‟t be true at any delineation. Given that we can‟t 
guarantee that any particular string of operators will be satisfied at any delineation and so we 
can‟t say which infinite string of operators will be the most indefinite that is true at any 
delineation, and thus we can‟t give any sort of direct characterisation of the nature of the 
infinitely sharp point of greatest indefiniteness. If we can‟t provide such a characterisation 
then perhaps the supervaluationist could claim that since we can't pick it out with a 
characterisation in terms of D operators then  there is no such most indefinitely tall height. 
This however is not the case, because although we can't pick out exactly what will be true at 
the most indefinite point we can be given an algorithm that, were it not for epistemic 
boundaries, could be used to pick out the most indefinitely tall height. This algorithm is 
sufficient to show that there will be such a height within this supervaluationist model and thus 
present the problem for this model. I will now detail the algorithm that can be used to pick out 
this point.  
 
 
9.2.2 The algorithm 
 
The first step is to systematically assign a finite real number to every vague boundary in 
higher-order vagueness. We can start this process in a fairly arbitrary fashion by specifying 
that the two 2
nd
 order vague boundaries, those between It and ¬It, are to both be numbered 
1/2
2
 
†††
. Now as illustrated in Figure 7 above, each boundary in nth order vagueness will 
                                                 
†††
 1/2
2
 is of course simply 1/4, but for the sake of understanding how the algorithm works it is simpler to think 
of it as 1/2
2
. 
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typically give rise to two boundaries in n+1 order vagueness. What is more, in the case of 
'tall' one will have a vague location that is higher than the other. I'll refer to these as the 
„mother boundary‟, the „high daughter boundary‟ and the „low daughter boundary‟. So if the 
mother is a boundary in nth order vagueness, then the high and low daughters are boundaries 
in n+1 order vagueness, and if the mother is in the vague area of 176.4cm – 176.8cm then the 
high daughter will be at about 176.8cm and the low daughter at about 176.4cm as illustrated 
in figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now let m be the number assigned to the mother boundary and n be the order of vagueness of 
t that gives rise to the daughter boundaries. Now for boundaries that are given rise to by the 
higher-order vagueness of the It |Dt boundary, let the number of the low daughter be m + 1/2
n
 
and the number of the high daughter be m – 1/2n. Alternatively for boundaries that are given 
rise to by the higher-order vagueness of the D¬t |It boundary, let the number of the low 
daughter be m – 1/2n and the number of the high daughter be m + 1/2n. This might seem very 
complex, but the end result is quite simple as illustrated in figure 9. It simply assigns every 
boundary a rational number between 0 and 1/2 such that the boundaries that are closer to the 
centre of the vague extension of It are assigned higher numbers and those further from the 
centre of the vague extension of It are assigned lower numbers. 
176.8cm 177cm 176.4cm 176.6cm 176.2cm 
Low daughter 
Mother boundary 
High daughter 
Figure 8 
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Now assuming as we are that there is no finite gap between those two “trees” of boundaries, 
then there will be an infinite number of boundaries at the level of infinite order vagueness 
between every two points between 185cm and 175cm. This means that every point between 
185cm and 175cm will be on at least one infinitely thin boundary in infinitely higher-order 
vagueness. The final step in the algorithm is to assign to every point between 185cm and 
175cm the lowest of the numbers of the boundaries in infinitely higher-order vagueness that 
the point corresponds to. With this assignment of numbers in place the most indefinitely 'tall' 
height that Francis could be is the height that has the highest number assigned to it, whatever 
that number may be. 
 
 
9.2.3 Defence of the choice of algorithm 
 
However, if the trees overlap the supervaluationist could reasonably ask why the point with 
the highest number assigned to it is the most indefinite. After all the assignments of the 
numbers were not only arbitrary, but systematically different for the boundaries that arise 
from the higher-order vagueness of the D¬t |It and the It |Dt boundaries. The general flavour 
of the whole algorithm might come across as unappealingly ad hoc. Under another 
185cm 180cm 175cm 
1 
4 
 
1 
8 
 
 1 
16 
 3 
8 
 
 3 
16 
 
 5 
16 
 
 7 
16 
 
1 
4 
 
1 
8 
 
3 
8 
 
 7 
16 
 
 5 
16 
 
 3 
16 
 
 1 
16 
 
Figure 9 
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assignment, if say, we instead for the boundaries that are given rise to by the higher-order 
vagueness of the D¬t |It assigned the number to the high daughter according to the formula m 
+ 1/2
2n
, then the point with the highest number that the critic claims is the point of greatest 
indefiniteness would be quite different. The key difference between the assignment that was 
actually used and other assignments that would give different results is that according to the 
assignment chosen the numbers are assigned symmetrically to reflect the symmetry of the 
boundaries. So for instance both the boundaries that are assigned 7/16 are of the form 
DDIp|IIIp, the difference between them is merely that p is in one case t and in the other ¬t. 
Since these are higher-order boundaries of the same boundary as in 1
st
 order vagueness there 
seems no reason to expect that the two boundaries of the form DDIp|IIIp would occur at 
different levels of indefiniteness and so they should be assigned the same number. Any system 
of assigning finite numbers to the boundaries that respects this symmetry and gives higher 
numbers to more indefinite boundaries will assign the highest number to the same point. So in 
spite of the fact that other number assignments could easily have been chosen, any assignment 
which respect these minimal principles will return the same point as the point of greatest 
indefiniteness. 
 
Thus the weaker than S4 supervaluationism once again has the same problem as degree 
theory. This model where D
∞
It isn't true at any delineation also gives rise to a single infinitely 
sharp point of greatest infiniteness above which Francis could be said to be „more tall than not 
tall‟ and below which he could be said to be „more not tall than tall‟. Once again this model of 
supervaluationism gives rise to the sort of problematic infinitely sharp boundary that 
supervaluationism is meant to avoid and it seems doubtful that the benefits of 
supervaluationism over epistemicism will be worth the complexity.  
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9.3 D
∞
It is true at a finite region of heights 
 
The final model we need to consider is that at which D
∞
It is true at a finite region of heights. 
This model, unlike the previous two, doesn‟t give rise to an infinitely sharp point above which 
Francis would be „more tall than not tall‟ and below which Francis would be „more not tall 
than tall‟ since there is no infinitely sharp boundary at the centre of the range of vagueness of 
t. Rather there is a central region where D
∞
It is true and contains no other boundaries. This 
might initially seem like a promising model to adopt to bypass the criticisms of the previous 
two models, but unfortunately it has problematic features that are at least as bad.  
 
The first and most immediate criticism is that it merely replaces one problematic sharp 
boundary with two. Both the boundaries to D
∞
It will be precise sharp boundaries: above the 
higher one Francis would be „more tall than not tall‟ and below it „not more tall than not tall‟; 
below the lower boundary Francis would be „more not tall than tall‟ and above it „not more 
not tall and tall‟. These seem like two quite problematic boundaries. It is analogous to a 
degree theory where there is an extended region where t has truth value 0.5, which is a model 
a degree theorist could also adopt if there were anything intuitively desirable about it. 
However it seems to me to be intrinsically less attractive than the previous two models since it 
seems mysterious that there should be such a calm eye to the storm of vagueness that 
surrounds it. 
 
The second problem is that it undermines the reply from the near impossible standard to 
Williamson‟s initial argument. It seems that if we are to accept that D*t isn‟t true even if 
Francis were tall enough to bump his head on the moon, then it seems implausible that D*It 
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will be true of any height and since D
∞
It ⊨ D*It that is exactly what the supervaluationist 
must claim. There doesn‟t seem to be any principled reason to make such a claim apart from 
to get out of a commitment to a single central infinitely sharp boundary, and so if such a 
model were accepted then the asymmetry in the model in its treatment of the standard 
required for something to be D* true would look more than a little ad hoc. 
 
 
9.4 The case against supervaluationism with weaker than S4 logic for D 
 
We‟ve worked through the three possible scenarios and the conclusion is that weaker than S4 
supervaluationism is tied to there at least being an infinitely sharp boundary between heights 
that are „more tall than not tall‟ and heights that are „not more tall than not tall‟. There are also 
significant disadvantages to denying there is an infinitely sharp boundary between heights that 
are „more tall than not tall‟ and heights that are „more not tall than tall‟.  What is more, I put 
this debate in terms of „tall‟, but the argument could easily be adapted for any vague term 
once a supervaluational analysis of that term has been constructed. I could for instance have 
just as easily have put it in terms of whether numbers are zoeyly or not. I could then have 
shown that there are two infinitely sharp boundaries between those numbers that are „more 
zoeyly than not zoeyly‟ and those that are „not more zoeyly than not zoeyly‟. 
Supervaluationism with a weaker than S4 logic for D  thus fails to maintain any significant 
advantage over supervaluationism with S4 or stronger logic for D. The extra complexity of 
the theory has failed to provide a solution to the problem of sharp boundaries in 
supervaluationism and this should be rejected in favour of the simpler supervaluationist model 
with S4 or stronger logic for D. I conclude this section by agreeing with Keefe (2000, 210) 
that the correct response for a supervaluationist to the problem of sharp boundaries is to reject 
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weaker than S4 logic for D as a needless complexity and adopt the iterated supervaluationist 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
10 Conclusion 
 
This is an extremely damaging result for supervaluationism since one of the most 
fundamental advantages of the theory was that it supposedly got away from the commitment 
to interesting sharp boundaries arising mysteriously from our use of terms. What I have 
demonstrated is that the only way for supervaluationism to rid itself of the spectre of sharp 
boundaries is to accept that the metalanguage must also be vague and that supervaluationism 
must be iterated. In light of Horgan‟s most recent argument that iterated supervaluationism is 
a form of transvaluationism this does not look like a good result for supervaluationism. 
 
Supervaluationalists are faced with a stark choice between iterated supervaluationism and 
sharp boundaries. If they choose iterated supervaluationism, then they face Horgan‟s 
argument that their theory is weakly logically incoherent and a form of transvaluationism. 
Alternatively if they choose sharp boundaries they must accept that their theory shares the 
main flaw of epistemicism and degree theories. 
 
Supervaluationism that admits sharp boundaries looks extremely unpalatable on the basis that 
it will be almost impossible to justify the complexity of supervaluationism‟s formal structure 
once it is admitted that it shares epistemicism‟s major weakness.  
 
Iterated supervaluationism on the other hand faces a serious challenge if it wishes to avoid 
being a form of transvaluationism. Failure to meet this challenge would be bad news for 
supervaluationism and good news for epistemic theories. It would, as Williamson noted, “be 
good news for epistemicism if transvaluationism turned out to be the only alternative” (2002, 
279). Good news because most will find the logical incoherence of transvaluationism 
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extremely unpalatable and would rather bite the bullet of sharp boundaries than the bullet of 
incoherence. However, my arguments above show that iterated supervaluationism is the only 
way a supervaluationist might be able to avoid sharp boundaries. For supervaluationism 
having the risk of being shown to be a form of transvaluationism makes the theory less 
attractive, but if supervaluationism is shown to be committed to sharp boundaries then for 
simplicities sake it should be forgotten in favour of simple epistemicism. I thus conclude that 
because of the problem of infinitely sharp boundaries the only good form of 
supervaluationism is iterated supervaluationism. It is unfortunate for supervaluationism that if 
Horgan is correct then the only “good” form of supervaluationism is a form of 
transvaluationism and committed to logical incoherence. 
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